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COMPARATIVE EMPIRICISM©
By JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK*

I. INTRODUCTION

The new millennium is emerging in a sea of economic confusion.
Even Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the United States Federal Reserve

Board, admits to uncertainty as he reads the economic entrails for his
congressional acolytes. Nowhere is the confusion more apparent than
with respect to consumer bankruptcy, where the dramatic increases in
bankruptcy filings among consumers in Canada and the United States
have puzzled and alarmed policymakers. We are thus especially
fortunate to have the benefit of two new and important studies of
consumer bankruptcy in Canada.
Some years ago I suggested that scholars and policymakers in
both countries could benefit greatly from comparative empirical work;!

Saul Schwartz and Iain Ramsay have made it possible.2 I will do the
obvious and compare their findings with some of the work that has been
done in the United States. 3 These articles are so rich with findings that
© 1999, J.L. Westbrook.
Benno C. Schmidt Chair of Business Law, The University of Texas School of Law. I am
grateful to David Johnson, class of 1999, and Ryan Bull, class of 2000, for their research assistance. I
am grateful to Jacob Ziegel for existing, making it unnecessary for the rest of us to invent him.
1 See J.L Westbrook, "A Comparative Empirical Research Agenda in Consumer Bankruptcy"
(1993) 21 Can. Bus. L.J. 30 [hereinafter "Comparative Agenda"].
2 See I.D.C. Ramsay, "Individual Bankruptcy: Preliminary Findings of a Socio-Legal Analysis"
(1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 15; and S. Schwartz, "The Empirical Dimensions of Consumer
Bankruptcy: Results From a Survey of Canadian Bankrupts" (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 83. Saul
Schwartz's article is based on the findings from an earlier study: see S. Schwartz & L. Anderson, An
Empirical Study of Canadians Seeking PersonalBankruptcy Protection (Ottawa: Industry Canada,
1998), online: Industry Canada <http:// strategis.ic.gc.ca/ SSG/ca00889e.html> (date accessed: 10
August 1999).
3 Because these authors have referred primarily to the work done by an American group of
which I am a member, the Consumer Bankruptcy Project, and because that is the work I know best,
I will refer primarily to our findings. However, a number of other studies have been done. Teresa
Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and I briefly review the American literature in our second book,
forthcoming in February, 2000, which I will not attempt to repeat here: see T.A. Sullivan, E. Warren
& J.L. Westbrook, The Fragile Middle Class (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press)
[forthcoming in 2000], Appendix 2 [hereinafter FragileMiddle Class]. That study was based on
questionnaires and file data from cases first filed in 1991. Of recent note is a very helpful new study
by Professors Marianne Culhane and Michaela White that was announced after these Canadian
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many comparisons and contrasts could be explored, but I will limit
myself to a few of the most interesting.
II. SIMILARITIES
A. Indebtedness
Both Schwartz and Ramsay find that their debtors are deeply in
debt. 4 Schwartz compares his figures to a 1977 study in Canada, and
finds that the debt burden of bankrupts is very similar to what it was
then.6 Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and I have made precisely the
same finding with respect to consumer bankrupts in the United States,
comparing 1981 and 1991 filings.7 This finding lends strong support to
two ideas. One is that there may be a "tipping point" of economic
distress at which substantial numbers of people decide to file for
bankruptcy protection. Of course, some people file with a lesser burden,
and some with a greater burden never file, but the figures in both
countries over two decades suggest that there is a level of indebtedness
that bears a significant relationship to the decision to file.
It would be interesting to do an analysis to compare the apparent
"tipping points" in the two countries. There are insufficient data in the
present articles to permit a detailed analysis, but we can compare debtto-income ratios as found by Ramsay in 1994 cases in Canada, and by
ourselves in 1991 cases in the United States. Debt-to-income ratios are
the most important means available to measure individual indebtedness,
because either debt level or income level by itself is meaningless when

studies had been completed: see M.B. Culhane & M.M. White, "Taking the New Consumer
Bankruptcy Model For a Test Drive: Means-Testing Real Chapter 7 Debtors" (1999) 7 Am. Bankr.
Inst. L. Rev. 27.

4 See Schwartz, supra note 2 at 88; and Ramsay, supra note 2 at 36.
5 See J.W. Brighton & J.A. Connidis, ConsumerBankruptsin Canada (Ottawa: Consumer and
Corporate Affairs Canada, 1982).
6 See Schwartz, supranote 2 at 103.
7 See T.A. Sullivan, E. Warren & J.L. Westbrook, "Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A

Financial Comparison of Consumer Bankrupts 1981-1991" (1994) 68 Am. Bankr. L.J. 121 at 136-38
[hereinafter "Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later"]. The figures in that preliminary report are
revised and developed in FragileMiddle Class, supra note 3. Our first study was reported in T.A.
Sullivan, E. Warren & J.L. Westbrook,As We Forgive OurDebtors: Bankruptcy and Consumer Credit

inAmerica (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) [hereinafter As We Forgive Our Debtors].
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the question is ability to satisfy one's creditors. 8 The debt-to-income
ratio shows the actual burden of debt.
Ramsay, like us, reports two ratios: total debt-to-income and
debt minus mortgages-to-income. The first is the overall reality, while
the second gives more of a picture of immediate, pressing obligations.
Ramsay reports a median total debt-to-income ratio of 2.14,9 which
means that the debtor owes more than two years of income in debt. Our
median figure from our second study in the United States is 1.8.10 For
non-mortgage debt, Ramsay reports a median ratio of 1.22,11 about
thirteen-and-one-half-months' income. We find a median non-mortgage
ratio of 1.06, just over one year's income worth of debt.12 (All figures
ignore the continually accruing interest at the usual substantial
consumer rates.) Thus, Americans filing for bankruptcy seem to be less
burdened than those in Canada, although all of them are far more debtburdened than the great majority of their fellow citizens. The list of
consequent questions is endless. Is the difference significant, statistically
or substantively? If so, why is it there? Is it because Canadian
bankruptcy is less attractive? Is it because Canadians are more Godfearing and debt-paying? The exploration of these and similar questions
might teach us a good deal.13
The second important point emerging from the comparison of
our findings with those of Schwartz and Ramsay is that the "tipping
point" has not greatly changed over time. Schwartz's confirmation that
in Canada, as in the United States, debt burdens found in bankruptcy
have stayed about the same over time, demonstrates that the great
increases in bankruptcy filings in the two countries do not reflect an
increased willingness to file by those with lesser burdens of debt. That is,
it is not true that, between 1977 and 1981, people in the two countries
resisted filing until they reached some great level of indebtedness, while
their filings more recently have been triggered by much more easily
borne debts. Indeed, given the very high ratios of debt-to-income
demonstrated in both countries throughout the period, there is little
8 Schwartz and Ramsay provide additional proof, if any were needed, that assets are essentially
irrelevant to debt payment in the great majority of consumer cases: see Schwartz, supra note 2 at
102-03; and Ramsay, supra note 2 at 46, Tables 7,9.
9 See Ramsay, supra note 2 at 36.
10 See "Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later," supra note 7 at 136, Table 2.
11 See Ramsay, supranote 2 at 36.
12 See "Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later," supra note 7 at 138, Table 3.
13 1could say "heuristic," but I promised Mom I would not.
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basis for the oft-made claim that bankruptcy has been made "too easy."
The great majority of bankrupts in both countries are filing with very
large debts in relation to their incomes.
B. Reasonsfor Filing
These studies, like our second consumer study, asked about the
reasons or causes of the debtors' bankruptcies, although each of the
three studies employed a different methodology. Schwartz gives a table
accompanied by brief commentary, while Ramsay devotes more
attention to this point. Nonetheless, the top (or tied for the top) reason
cited as a cause of bankruptcy in both Canadian studies, like our second
study, is job loss or other employment adversity. Ramsay reports that 24
per cent of the overall sample, and 28 per cent of "pure consumer"
debtors, cite "adverse employment change" as the reason for their
bankruptcies. 14 In our American study, in which the debtors were
permitted to list multiple causes, job-related causes were named by
almost half of the debtors, and were the only reasons given by more than
a quarter-results very similar to Ramsay's,15 although somewhat higher
than those reported by Schwartz.16 For us, this point is closely related to
the importance of focusing on volatility-that is, the change in the
debtors' circumstances rather than their status at the moment of filing.
Another similarity in the Canadian and American studies is the
focus on small-business failures as a leading cause of "consumer"
bankruptcy. Schwartz concludes that the increased number of smallbusiness start-ups in Canada may be an important reason for increasing
bankruptcies. 1 7 As I read it, Ramsay's data indicates that 24 per cent of
his sample overall give reasons relating to business failure as the cause of
their bankruptcies.18 Even when he looks only at a "pure" consumer
14

See Ramsay, supra note 2 at 61.

15 See ibid. at 61, Table 14; and FragileMiddle Class, supra note 3, c. 2. Ramsay reports an
unemployment rate in Ontario of near 10 per cent in 1994: see Ramsay, supra note 2 at 36. At the
time of our second study, the unemployment rate in the United States was just below 7 per cent: see
FragileMiddle Class,supra note 3, c. 3.
16 See Schwartz, supra note 2 at 92, Table 2. Because Schwartz does not provide much
information about how these questions were posed and tabulated, it is difficult to speculate why his
figures differ substantially from Ramsay's.
17
See ibid. at 107-08.
18 I arrived at that figure by adding together the categories "business failure," "guarantor,"
and "real estate investment failure" in the data: see Ramsay, supra note 2 at 61, Table 14. Ramsay
indicates that collapsing these categories is justified: see ibid. at 62. It would be helpful if he would
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sample, it includes 10 per cent citing essentially business reasons.
Furthermore, Schwartz's data seem to indicate, as our data clearly do,
that debts in the average business bankruptcy case are much larger than
in the typical consumer case. Thus, business debts constitute a much
larger percentage of overall "consumer" indebtedness than the
percentage of business cases would suggest. 19
It is important for policymakers to understand that much of
"consumer" bankruptcy is really small-business bankruptcy. It is
important because the causes and "cures" of business and consumer
bankruptcy are not the same. Furthermore, social attitudes about the
two are very different: popularly, consumer bankruptcy is the refuge of
ne'er do wells and cheats, while business bankruptcy is just an
intersection collision on the highway of capitalism. Finally, the
effects-personal and economic-of various "remedies" will be
understood, correctly, to be very different when applied to business
people or to ordinary consumers.
There are a number of other striking similarities in reported
findings between Canada and the United States. For example, the sharp
increase in the number of women filing alone, found by Schwartz and
Ramsay in Canada, is comparable to the finding of our second study in
the United States. 20 But there are also some important apparent
differences, to which I will now turn.
III. DIFFERENCES
A. Home-ownership
The most striking, and difficult to explain, difference in the
Canadian and American findings is the percentage of home-owners.
Schwartz and Ramsay each found around 25 per cent or fewer of their
samples were home-owners at the time of filing bankruptcy, while in the
United States we found about one-half of our two samples, a decade
give a clearer explanation of how he dealt with multiple-cause responses, and how he distinguished

"pure consumer" bankruptcies.

19 In our first study, we found only 10 per cent of the debtors were self-employed at the time
of filing, but another 10 per cent were formerly self-employed with much business debt in their
filings. This entrepreneurial 20 per cent accounted for almost half the total debt in the sample: see
As We Forgive Our Debtors, supra note 7 at 118.
20 See Schwartz, supra note 2 at 93; Ramsay, supra note 2 at 31; and FragileMiddle Class,supra
note 3, c. 2. The percentage rose from 17 per cent in our study of American cases first filed in 1981,
to 30 per cent of those first filed in 1991.
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apart, consisted of debtors who owned their homes when they filed for
bankruptcy. 21 Yet the home-owner proportion in the two countries is
virtually identical at 64 per cent. 22 Why the difference?
One answer might be age. If the bankrupts in Canada were
younger, then it would not be surprising that they included fewer homeowners. The Canadian studies are somewhat inconsistent. Our second
study's sample was slightly older than the average age of the United
States population. 23 Ramsay reports that the median age for Canadian
bankrupts was 37,24 just a year younger than the median age we found in
the American bankruptcy sample; his sample was disproportionately
middle-aged, just like ours.2 5 Schwartz suggests his sample is younger
than the Canadian population, but his report is not entirely clear, and no
precise figure is stated.26 Thus, the jury remains out for now about age
comparisons.
B. Home Surrender
There is another striking difference that must bear some
relationship to the home-owner question. Ramsay looks at former homeowners-an excellent example of the importance of looking at change in
debtors' lives as the key to understanding the bankruptcy
phenomenon-and finds another 20 per cent who lost their homes
before bankruptcy. 27 Adding them to current home-owners would get
the total close to the percentage of home-owners that we found in the
United States. To the extent that that result narrows the differences in
findings, however, it raises another compelling difference: far more
Canadians are apparently unable or unwilling to use bankruptcy to keep
their homes. Although it is not clear how many lost their homes by

21 See Schwartz, supra note 2 at 106, Table 6 (assuming I am right to figure home-owners and
mortgage owners as roughly co-incident in bankruptcy); Ramsay, supra note 2 at 42; FragileMiddle
Class, supra note 3, c. 7; andAs We Forgive Our Debtors,supra note 7 at 129. The smaller sample in
our second study had a lower home-ownership rate, but we have strong reason to believe it was
understated.
22 See Ramsay, supranote 2 at 42; andAs We Forgive Our Debtors,supra note 7 at 129.
23 See FragileMiddle Class, supranote 3, c. 2.
24

Ramsay, supranote 2 at 30.

25 See FragileMiddle Class, supranote 3, c. 2.
26 See Schwartz, supranote 2 at 93-94.
27

Ramsay, supranote 2 at 43.
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forced sale, 28 Ramsay finds that a number had sold their houses to pay
their debts or living expenses, a phenomenon that did not loom large in
our data in the United States, although we did not search for it
systematically. 2 9 We also did not see large numbers of debtors in

bankruptcy who had lost their homes in forced sales, something our first
study would have caught.3 0
Understanding this apparent difference-much lower homeownership rates in bankruptcy caused to some extent by frequent prebankruptcy liquidations of homes to pay debt-might tell us a great deal.
Is it important that Ontario, where Ramsay's sample was drawn, has very
low exemptions, so that he might have found a different pattern in, say,

Alberta?3 1 Might the higher exemptions in most states help to explain a
home-ownership difference between Canadian and American debtors? 3 2

Is it important that Canadian mortgages are typically for five years?
American observers would have thought that a twenty- to thirty-year
home mortgage is a law of nature. Might that difference in "mortgage
culture" help explain the lower percentage of home-owning Canadian
bankrupts and the higher incidence of former home-owners? 33
C. Debtor's Socio-EconomicPosition

A third possible difference in findings is the class position of
debtors. One of the most startling conclusions of our first study in the
United States was that debtors were close to being a cross-section of the

28

An analysis of the 20 per cent of former home-owners might be instructive in this regard.

29 Based on our extensive examination of the files and questionnaires in the two studies, I
think it is highly unlikely that a widespread practice of selling homes to pay debts prior to
bankruptcy would be found in the United States. There is also no indication of that practice in other
studies, nor any anecdotal evidence to that effect.
30
SeeAs We Forgive OurDebtors,supra note 7 at 140-41.
31 Although Schwartz sampled nationally and found only 22 per cent home-ownership, it is not
clear whether he looked at former home-owners.
32 Within the United States, however, we found that differing exemption laws had very little
impact on debtor behaviour or characteristics: seeAs We Forgive Our Debtors,supra note 7 at 242-43.
33 Do Canadian banks just adjust the interest rate and roll those mortgages, or do they do a
new credit check? If the latter, then one could understand how Canadians who had lost their jobs
and run up large bills might sell their houses in the face of the likely non-renewal of their
mortgages. But if mortgages are not renewed, and the houses are not sold by the debtors, then the
banks get the houses. In the United States, the last thing the bank wants is the house. Is it different
in Canada? The dynamics of that relationship must have something to do with the question
explored in the text.
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general population. We used occupational prestige scores to show that
34
American debtors were just below the median in occupational prestige.
Our second study has confirmed those results.35 By contrast, Schwartz
concludes that Canadian debtors represent a somewhat lower slice of
Canadian society. 36 Ramsay, on the other hand, gets results much closer
to our results, although somewhat more skewed toward the lower part of
the middle class. 37
Schwartz and Ramsay use similar methods to compare bankrupts
with the general population; nevertheless they seem to have substantial
differences in their samples. 38 Those differences could result from a
national versus an Ontario sample, so it would be interesting for
Schwartz to run an Ontario query on this point.
As to the differences between the Canadian and American
results 6n occupational prestige-slight in Ramsay's study, substantial in
Schwartz's-one reason for the difference might be the difference in
home-ownership: home-owners, I thought, would have more prestigious
occupations. The problem with that explanation is that I ran our secondstudy prestige scores controlling for home-ownership within the
American sample and, to my surprise, found no statistically significant
difference in prestige scores between owners and non-owners-a classic
example of a "beautiful theory murdered by a gang of brutal facts."
Another explanation for the difference might be the methods
used. The two Canadian articles use an occupational category
framework to compare percentages of each category between the
bankrupts and the general population, while we used standardized
prestige scores to make numerical comparisons between bankrupts and
the general population, occupation by occupation. 39
34

SeeAs We Forgive Our Debtors,supra note 7 at 88-91.

35 See FragileMiddle Class,supra note 3, c. 2.
36 See Schwartz, supra note 2 at 102.
37

See Ramsay, supra note 2 at 39-40.
38 For example, they both report 7.8 per cent of the Canadian population as "unskilled
clerical/sales/service," but Schwartz reports 14.2 per cent of his sample in this category, while
Ramsay reports only 6.4 per cent: see Schwartz, supra note 2 at 100, Table 4; and Ramsay, supra
note 2 at 39, Table 6. The difference is likely to be significant.
39 See FragileMiddle Class, supra note 3, c. 2; and As We Forgive Our Debtors, supra note 7 at
89-90. The over-representation of various lower prestige occupations, especially in the Schwartz
sample, may arise from a skewing of the sample by a severe under-representation of professionals,
Of course, the absence of professionals may represent the reality, but it seems unlikely to me that so
few professionals would seek legal assistance because of financial distress. Could they be in
"proposal" proceedings? But see Ramsay, supra note 2 at 40 (few cases of professionals' commercial
proposals). Might they refuse to cooperate in the questionnaire process?
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Finally, to some extent the difference is one of judgement. To
oversimplify, Ramsay is impressed that the Canadian bankrupts look like
most of the population, except for the small percentage at the top.
Similarly, we are impressed that our bankrupts had prestige scores just
south of the United States median. On the other hand, Schwartz is
struck by the relatively low number of high-ranked managers and
professionals in the bankrupt population.
It is important to emphasize, however, that all three of us agree
that bankruptcy is not dominated by the poor labouring classes or longterm economic failures. For the most part, in both countries, bankrupts
come from the middle- and working-class portion of the occupational
spectrum.
IV. LESSONS FOR AMERICAN INVESTIGATORS
There are many things American investigators can learn from
these studies. One of the most interesting is the focus on governmental
assistance. Both Schwartz and Ramsay find that Canadian debtors have
been the recipients of substantial public money prior to bankruptcy.
That is not something that has been found in the United States, but for
the most part it is also not something for which American investigators
have looked. Given the important relationship between bankruptcy and
other elements in the social safety net, the extent of participation of
bankrupts in public programs should be fully explored. One of the
problems our European friends have faced is that strict bankruptcy laws,
without discharge, coupled with generous social services, amounted to
taxpayer assumption of debt repayment for those in economic distress.
Thus, the role of public expenditures prior to bankruptcy should be
added to research agendas in the United States, ideally coupled with
data from the post-bankruptcy lives of the debtors as well.
Among the other especially valuable findings in these studies are
the analyses of the types of debts incurred by the debtors.40 We did that
sort of analysis in our first study,41 but not in our second. The detailed
analysis here, especially in the Ramsay article, is very helpful to
understanding the emerging patterns of consumer credit, and the
coincident and conflicting interests of various sorts of creditors.

40

See Schwartz, supra note 2 at 106, Table 6; and Ramsay, supra note 2 at 53, Table 11.

41 SeeAs We Forgive Our Debtors, supra note 7, c. 14-17.
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V. SUGGESTIONS FOR CANADIAN INVESTIGATORS
If one were to suggest approaches for the additional studies
these excellent articles will surely provoke, the first from me would be
more focus on volatility: on changes in the debtors' circumstances. The
great financial revolution of recent years was the discovery of the
importance of the delta in the markets-the change, the rate of change,
and the change in the rate of change-rather than their state at any
given time. The same thing holds true for debts. The key point is not
debt, or even the debt-to-income ratio, at any given moment (for
example, the moment of bankruptcy), but the change from an earlier
time, before the layoff, or before the big debts were incurred.
Bankruptcy is caused by debt. No debt, no bankruptcy. On the
other hand, bankruptcy arises most often because of a change in the
relationship between debt and the ability to pay debt. For the
overwhelming majority, the ability to pay relates to income rather than
to liquidation of assets. It must be very rare that bankruptcy occurs when
there has been a long-standing stability in the relationship between debt
and income in the life of a debtor. Thus, changes in debt-to-income
ratios are key. Also important are methods of learning about job and
income changes, along with marital disruptions, sickness and injury, and
other events likely to affect debts, income, and the ratio between them.
Our second study, using questionnaires to ask about possible
disruptions, has found that disrupted lives-jobs, marriages, health, and
more-constitute the central characteristic of debtors.4 2 A next-stage
Canadian investigation with more focus on these sorts of recent changes
would be very useful.
I would also suggest more focus on "local legal culture." Our
work in the United States suggests the importance of the attitudes and
customs of the repeat players in the bankruptcy system.4 3 This legal
culture is sometimes more important than the provisions of the statute.
It would be interesting, for example, to see what results Schwartz would
get from certain variables if he compared his Ontario data alone with
Ramsay's. 44
42

See FragileMiddle Class, supranote 3.

43 See T.A. Sullivan, E. Warren & J.L. Westbrook, "The Persistence of Local Legal Culture:
Twenty Years of Evidence From the Federal Bankruptcy Courts" (1994) 17 Harv. J. L & Pub. Pol'y

801.
44 In general, it would be helpful if Schwartz could give a more detailed breakdown of the
source of questionnaires as among the various provinces, which types of trustees ("core" versus
"non-core") provided what percentages of responses, and so forth. Indeed, some breakdowns by

1999]

ComparativeEmpiricism

Because variations in local legal culture are sometimes more
important than variations in local laws, it would be very helpful to follow
the work of Jean Braucher and Gary Neustadter to learn more about
how trustees in Canada and bankruptcy lawyers in the United States
compare and contrast. 45 Ramsay makes an interesting start on this
point,46 and one would love to see more.
In addition, although formal law matters less than people might
suppose, it still matters; it would be interesting to compare the effects, if
any, of key legal differences across the border. For example, Ramsay
states that objections to discharge are rarely made by creditors in
Canada because of the free-rider problem-one creditor gets little
benefit from a successful objection that benefits all creditors. 47 In the
United States, in contrast, a creditor can achieve a terrific result through
a successful "section 523" objection: its debt is not discharged, the rest
are, and it has the ideal one-debt debtor.
The two points-local law and local legal culture-come
together in joint filing by spouses. Ramsay indicates that Canadian law
now permits it, but Canadian incentives for trustees virtually preclude
it.48 The lack of joint filing may or may not explain some of the other
differences in the characteristics of debtors in the United States, where
joint filings make up around one-half of all filings. 49
Finally, these Canadian researchers need to do comparisons
between themselves. They should take advantage of the good fortune of
two such important studies done within a short period of time. All of us
who do empirical work are guilty of collaborating too little. These two
authors could criticize and compare their articles far better than I ever
could-and the results would be most valuable.

provinces or types of trustees as to certain variables might reveal interesting patterns.

45 See J. Braucher, "Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures" (1993)
67 Am. Bankr. L.J. 501; and G. Neustadter, "When Lawyer and Client Meet: Observations of
Interviewing and Counseling Behavior in the Consumer Bankruptcy Law Office" (1986) 35 Buff. L.
Rev. 177 at 239.
46 See Ramsay, supra note 2 at 67-68.
47
48

Ibid. at 70.
Ibid. at 64.

49 SeeAs We Forgive OurDebtors,supra note 7 at 154, Table 8.2.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Schwartz suggests that increased credit granted to certain subgroups might partially explain the increase in consumer bankruptcies in
Canada. His suggestion strikes me as plausible for the United States as
well. Focusing on some key sub-groups to see if they have become a
more important part of the credit market-and therefore of the
bankruptcy picture-may be a fruitful direction for future research.50
Ramsay is generally interested in looking beyond the immediate
policy questions to develop an understanding of the roles of the various
actors in the bankruptcy system, and to see that system generally in the
larger context of social systems. As my earlier remarks indicate, I think
he is exactly right.
Nonetheless, an appropriate closing note is that both of these
Canadian investigators have found policy-relevant facts very similar to
those we have reached in the Consumer Bankruptcy Project in the
United States. On the whole, the two bankruptcy systems are serving
people labouring with very serious, often unpayable debt, just as they are
supposed to do. If we have a bankruptcy problem in either country, it is a
function of over-indebtedness (one possible cause: greed), or injury to
capacity to pay indebtedness (one possible cause: downsizing), rather
than some technical fault in the legal system. No doubt we should keep
our eyes on the hospitals, but our central concern should be the increase
in disease. Making it harder to get into the hospital will not give us a
healthy population.

50 I am more sceptical about his dismissal of increased consumer credit as a contributing
cause: see Schwartz, supra note 2 at 86-87. A few years ago, I suggested that there is a close
relationship between increased consumer credit and increased bankruptcy, using a rough graphic
comparison to make my point: see "Comparative Agenda," supra note 1 at 36, Chart 2. Diane Ellis
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has made the same point with a far more rigorous
technical analysis: see D. Ellis, "The Effect of Consumer Interest Rate Deregulation on Credit Card
Volumes, Charge-offs, and the Personal Bankruptcy Rate" Bank Trends: Analysis of Emerging Risks
in Banking (March 1998) 1. I would need to know much more about the numbers in Canada to
engage Schwartz on his Figure 1 and its implications, but I will note that residential mortgage debt
is consumer debt, so a predominance of mortgage debt does not mean increased "consumer" debt is
not a cause of increased bankruptcy.

